
Across the Etowah and into the Hell-Hole: Johnston's Lost Chance for Victory in the Atlanta Campaign

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Despite being one of the more important campaigns of the American Civil War, the Atlanta Campaign has been somewhat underrepresented throughout the literature on the subject. While this oversight has been somewhat rectified in light of the sesquicentennial celebrations, most of these writings have focused on either the major battles that happened from late June 1864 through the fall of Atlanta or on the various commanders of the campaign. Nearly forgotten amongst all of this is the fighting that took place on the country crossroads and in the deep forests near Dallas, Georgia between 25 May and 4 June 1864. It was during this period of fighting that the Atlanta Campaign went from a series of quick flanking maneuvers to a constant daily grind of skirmishes and entrenchment, with little respite from weather-induced misery and the constant fear of death from an enemy one could not see. It was during this time that Confederate commander Joseph Johnston had the best chance to turn back the invasion of Georgia headed by Union general William T. Sherman. Johnston was able to effect a major change in the tempo and character of the campaign in the fighting around Dallas. However, his failure to contest Sherman's crossing of the Etowah River and his inability to stop the Union general from reconnecting with an unbroken Western & Atlantic Railroad ensured that the Confederates lost their best chance at stopping the invasion of Georgia.

The Armies Face Off

Going into the Atlanta Campaign, both commanders knew they faced a herculean task. Johnston's challenge when he took over the Army of Tennessee in December 1863 was to stop the much stronger Union forces from passing into Georgia and taking Atlanta, a city of just over 22,000. Atlanta, an important rail hub for the South and home to a number of mills and ammunition factories, was a vital strategic target.¹ However, following the disastrous battle at Missionary Ridge outside of Chattanooga, Tennessee the previous year, there was much work to do to ensure a strong fighting force for the Army of Tennessee. When Johnston took over, he inherited a severely demoralized and weakened force which he immediately set about drilling and preparing for the coming campaign, but with a

strength of around 38,000 men, he realized he had to find more men before a campaign could be launched. By the end of April, he had collected a force of nearly 60,000 effective men and 154 cannon. General Leonidas Polk reinforced him with an additional 15,000 at Resaca.² While not a match in size for their foe, it was still a formidable force.

The Confederate Army of Tennessee, as it stood on the eve of the campaign, was a quite capable military force. It consisted of three corps of infantry, Lieutenant General William J. Hardee with four divisions, Lieutenant General John B. Hood with three divisions, Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk with two divisions, and a cavalry corps under Major General Joseph Wheeler with three divisions.³ Johnston's constant drilling in the winter after taking command had a noticeable effect on Confederate morale, and the once demoralized forces were ready to fight once more.




Figure 1. General Joseph Johnston, C.S.A.
Photograph by Mathew Brady. National Archives.

Johnston knew, since he was facing a much larger force, that he would have to conserve his forces throughout the coming campaign. In order to combat the difference in manpower he had to adopt a Fabian-like strategy in which he would pull back behind strong entrenchments and try to entice Sherman to attack on his terms. When successful, it led to impressive Confederate victories.⁴ Though Johnston was not averse to striking an isolated portion of the enemy lines, he preferred a defensive stance until Sherman could be defeated in battle and then chased back north. He refused the urging of Jefferson Davis and Braxton Bragg to strike into Tennessee before Sherman could advance, knowing he needed every man he could get for the coming campaign into Georgia.⁵

After President Abraham Lincoln called Ulysses S. Grant east from Chattanooga, Sherman was left in command of the western theater. Sherman had two roles to fill, first as commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi and



Figure 2. General William T. Sherman.
Photograph by Mathew Brady. National Archives

second as a field commander of three armies stationed at Chattanooga. Besides Sherman's previous command of the Army of the Tennessee, now commanded by Major General James McPherson and consisting of three corps, Sherman also had at his disposal the four corps of Major General George Thomas's Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Ohio, which consisted of one corps under Major General John Schofield—all told around 100,000 men.⁶ Sherman had a nearly two-to-one advantage in men and he planned to use that advantage to crush the enemy.

Sherman's campaign served two major purposes in the Union war effort. Not only was it meant to destroy the Army of Tennessee and end it as an effective fighting force, the offensive into the heart of Georgia was meant to take out as much of the South's ability to wage war as possible, weakening both Johnston's and Robert E. Lee's ability to continue fighting.⁷ Sherman knew that attacking Johnston in his fortified positions was a futile effort, so from the beginning he followed a strategy of flanking the Confederate forces and forcing them to pull back or risk being cut off from their supply lines. Sherman had one major weakness, though. He was advancing into hostile territory with only a single supply line, the Western & Atlantic Railroad, of which he said after the war that the "Atlanta Campaign of 1864 would have been impossible without that road."⁸ As future events would point out, Sherman needed the railroad. When he was not able to pull back quickly to it after attempting a flanking maneuver, things would become a near disaster.

To the Etowah

It is safe to say that up to the point where Sherman crossed the Etowah River, the Atlanta Campaign had gone completely in his favor. Beginning on 7 May 1864, the three Union armies under Sherman's command had forced Johnston out of several strongly entrenched positions with minimal casualties and at a frightening speed. Though Sherman's initial plan was to have the Army of the Tennessee march on Rome, Georgia while his other two armies held the Confederate forces at their heavily fortified positions outside the town of Dalton along Rocky Face Ridge, he instead sent this army through an undefended gap in the mountains of north Georgia, known as Snake Creek Gap. Had McPherson and his army gone through the gap to capture Resaca, Johnston would have been completely cut off from Atlanta. McPherson, however, felt he was in danger trying to go through the gap and stopped to fortify the entrance, alerting Johnston to his presence. This maneuver forced Johnston to pull back from Dalton during

the night of 12 May to protect the Western & Atlantic Rail Road, which served as Johnston's lifeline just as much as it did Sherman's.⁹ With this, Johnston began his backwards march through Georgia.

The town of Resaca was the next scene of conflict in the campaign. Johnston was able to once again create a strong fortified position here, especially with the arrival of Leonidas Polk's men. On 14 May, Sherman launched a strong attack at the Confederate center at Resaca, while sending Thomas Sweeney's division from the XVI Corps to the south to flank Johnston's army. The following




Figure 3. Union Advance from Chattanooga to the Etowah River. Map by J. Britt McCarley, United States Army Center of Military History

day, he sent Joseph Hooker's XX Corps to attack the Confederate right as Sweeney's men crossed the Oostanaula River at Lay's Ferry.¹⁰ The fighting at Resaca was intense. Johnston's men were able to break up each attack, and even attempted to counterattack the Union left. According to historian Earl J. Hess, the fighting around Resaca turned into a "slugging match" between two entrenched armies. However, even with intense artillery fire throughout much of the battle, Sherman was able to slip men from a single division around the left flank of the Confederate forces. Once again, Johnston felt he had to withdraw from a strong position.¹¹ Without a decisive victory, Sherman had forced Johnston backwards.

Following Resaca, Johnston pulled back to the Cassville line. He sent Hood and Polk directly to Cassville and dispatched Hardee and Wheeler's cavalry to Cassville via Kingston, a move that forced Sherman to split his forces.¹² With Sherman's forces split, Johnston had a chance to strike out on the offensive himself. He planned for Hardee to quickly swing back to Cassville and with the Army of Tennessee reunite and attack one part of the split Union army. Hood received faulty intelligence that foiled the plan, as it caused him to fall back at a critical moment.¹³ Johnston's chance to attack had passed, and as the Federal army moved in he pulled back again, giving up even more territory.

Across the River

Johnston began to pull back again, leaving Cassville on the night of 19 May, and burning the railroad and road bridges as he left the area.¹⁴ After crossing the river and leaving it undefended, Johnston made his way to a previously prepared position at Allatoona Pass, one of the strongest positions occupied by either side during the campaign. The state of Georgia created Allatoona Pass specifically for the Western & Atlantic Railroad, and Johnston felt that he had finally found a location that would force Sherman to attack him in a strong defensive position.¹⁵ Johnston's plan, however, did not work out as he wanted, as Sherman did the unthinkable. Sherman had visited the area in 1844 and was familiar with its defensive capabilities.¹⁶ If Sherman was able to get behind the Confederate army he could sever the Confederate supply line and take out Johnston's troops, but this would require leaving the protection of a long but stable supply line. The rewards were potentially great, but the risk was too. By leaving his supply line, Sherman ensured that he only had a limited amount of time and resources to achieve his goals before he was stuck without food for his army.

Sherman took several days to prepare for his movement to flank Allatoona Pass. He arrived at his headquarters in Kingston on 20 May and began

to prepare for the upcoming movement. Over the next couple of days, Sherman ordered all sick and wounded men to the rear. He required that the troops gather twenty days' worth of supplies and that they forage for fresh meat and vegetables. However, he did not allow indiscriminate pillaging of the populace.¹⁷ He then began deliberations on where his men would cross and how his supply line would remain properly defended from the constant threat of Confederate cavalry.

Sherman knew he needed to continue to protect his supply line, but he also realized he needed to find a replacement for the detachments of infantry necessary for this task. Leaving those already performing this task in place, he directed Brigadier General John E. Smith to move his division from Alabama toward Kingston, Georgia via Rome.¹⁸ With his supply line protected from enemy cavalry, he then turned his attention to how he would get his large body of men across the Etowah River. Sherman, in the interest of ensuring that his armies kept out of each other's way on the march, had them stationed at three separate areas while preparing for the crossing. The Army of the Ohio, along with Stoneman's cavalry, was encamped at Cassville Depot, the Army of the Cumberland was near Cassville, and the Army of the Tennessee was stationed in Kingston. He stationed additional troops at Rome under Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis.¹⁹ Sherman commanded that all the armies prepare to move out on 23 May.

With this large number of men, Sherman had to devise a plan to cross the Etowah at a limited number of points against an unknown level of resistance from Johnston's forces. Sherman set the town of Dallas, Georgia as the next target for his forces. Dallas was a crossroads town approximately fourteen miles south of the Etowah and sixteen miles to the west of the important town of Marietta, Georgia, the next target of the Union advance.²⁰ In a great stroke of luck, Sherman's men were able to save two bridges across the river from destruction at the hands of the retreating Confederates, bridges that would prove to be instrumental in allowing Federal forces to cross. McPherson took his men across one of these, Wooley's Bridge, and proceeded on the longest march of Sherman's troops, moving southwest through Van Wert and then approaching Dallas from the west, bringing up Sherman's right. Thomas, minus Hooker's XX corps and occupying the center of Sherman's march, used Gillem's Bridge and a nearby ford to cross, moving south to Dallas through Euharlee and Stilesboro. On the left of Sherman's army was Schofield's Army of the Ohio and Stoneman's cavalry, with instructions to cross a pontoon bridge near one of the bridges destroyed by Johnston and protect the flank of the army closest to the Confederate positions at Allatoona, though Hooker's corps delayed their crossing. Hooker decided that Sherman must have wanted him to get across as fast as possible, so he took the pontoon bridge when it

was empty. This left Schofield hours behind schedule.²¹

Most of these groups were across the river by the evening of 23 May and on their way toward Dallas. Sherman was confident of his success after finding the river crossing generally uncontested. On 23 May, he sent several pieces of correspondence in which he mentioned the expectations of a quick and successful movement. To Major General Francis P. Blair in Huntsville he stated that all of his forces were in motion toward Marietta, which he felt would force Johnston back to the Chattahoochee River just outside of Atlanta.²² He would not reach Marietta until he forced Johnston from the slopes of Kennesaw Mountain in early July. In a ciphered message sent the same day, Sherman called the Etowah the “Rubicon of Georgia” and let it be known the Union forces would “swarm along the Chattahoochee in five days,” a goal he would not reach for another six weeks.²³ Sherman felt that he had the advantage of Johnston, who had so far shown an ability to pull out of a compromised position and reinsert the Confederate forces between Atlanta and the invaders. Sherman could not have been more wrong.

Though the crossing had been mostly uncontested, Johnston had scouts stationed along the river reporting on Union movements. While he would later mention in his official report of the campaign that crossing the Etowah and letting the enemy cross unmolested was a major regret, it did allow him to move quickly to block Sherman’s advance toward Dallas.²⁴ Johnston used his cavalry to keep watch, and by the time the first units began to move on 23 May, they had informed him of the movement. The Confederate commander was able to ascertain easily that the only place for Sherman to head was Dallas and he immediately began preparing troops to move out. By the evening of 23 May Johnston had sent out both Hardee and Polk’s corps, leaving Hood to protect Allatoona in case Sherman had used some of his men to feint to the west while then moving for the strong position on the rail line.²⁵

Johnston also decided to make aggressive use of his cavalry forces. He sent Wheeler’s corps back across the river to harass the Federal rear at Cartersville, and used William Jackson’s division to skirmish with the advancing Union troops. While Wheeler was unable to destroy enough rail to compromise Union supply lines, he was able to capture or destroy one hundred supply wagons and beat up the regiment guarding them. Jackson, on the other hand, retreated from a confrontation at Burnt Hickory with Union troops under Thomas, who was able to capture a letter from Johnston stating he was moving to block Sherman’s advance.²⁶ Sherman disregarded the letter as a bluff, something he would later come to regret.

With Johnston pulling troops out of Allatoona Pass, Sherman had once again forced the southern army out of a strong position. However, as Johnston was

operating on interior lines, while Sherman swung out wide through the countryside, the Confederate commander was able to react quickly to the Union advance. Johnston benefitted from the terrain of the area as well. After leaving the mountains in the first days of the campaign, the two armies had moved into a region that had decent roads, and hilly, but generally navigable terrain. Once across the Etowah, this changed greatly. By 24 May, the Union forces had entered densely wooded terrain of which Sherman later recalled as “difficult” and barren of forage and useable roads.²⁷ This worked to the advantage of the Confederates, for the roads they were using were in much better shape.

On 24 May, Johnston realized the logical place for Sherman’s forces to rendezvous was Dallas and made a catastrophic error. Instead of leaving at least a small garrison force at Allatoona, he ordered all of Hood’s corps to the west behind the rest of the Confederate forces.²⁸ About this time, Sherman was working to reconnect all of his forces together to push eastward from the Dallas area toward Marietta and the Western & Atlantic. The pieces fell in place for a clash in the woods, one that those who fought through it remembered for its ferocity.

Fighting in the Hell Hole

Upon arriving in Dallas, Johnston began situating his forces to block Sherman’s advance. Hood took up position on the Confederate left at New Hope Church, Polk took the center position, and Hardee held the right, just east of Dallas.²⁹ Once in place, the Confederates furiously began digging in for the attack they knew was on the way. Early that afternoon, just hours after Hood took up position, Hooker, as the lead element of the Army of the Cumberland, led his troops in fighting that was so severe that one Federal division commander later said his whole division went through their allotment of 60 rounds of ammunition during the fight.³⁰ Despite a strong showing by the Union forces, Hood’s corps was able to repulse the enemy with heavy losses. Hooker’s men had suffered 1,500 casualties to Hood’s 500, with the Union forces falling back as a thunderstorm set in over the battlefield.³¹ While both armies spent the following day building trenches, Sherman was on the verge of unleashing a full attack on Confederate positions.

Sherman was quite frustrated by this point. Not only had the Confederates blocked the way toward the Chattahoochee River and the city of Atlanta once again but Sherman had also left his supply line to move across country and was beginning to feel the pinch. On 27 May, Sherman decided he would make one last attempt to push around the right flank of the rebel army and that afternoon began the battle of Pickett’s Mill. Sherman sent two divisions well to the right of what he

thought was Johnston's forces and got a rude surprise in the form of Major General Patrick Cleburne's division.³² Heavy fighting broke out in the midst of the Georgia wilderness, as well as another thunderstorm. As the initial attack broke down, reinforcements rushed in to help the faltering Union advance, but to no avail. The Confederates badly bloodied the Union forces, costing them around 1,600 men that day. The loss so upset Sherman that he never mentioned the battle in his official reports or in his memoirs after the war.³³ Sherman was ready to pull back to his supply lines, but before he could, one more action occurred. This time it was the Confederate's turn to blunder.

Johnston had finally stymied Sherman in the Georgian wilderness and felt the time was right to attempt an offensive maneuver of his own. Johnston had figured out that Sherman would be attempting to move back toward his supply lines and ordered Hardee to attack McPherson's Army of the Tennessee at the first sign of movement from the Federal troops. On the afternoon of 28 May, Hardee ordered three divisions to charge the Federal works in a disastrous attack that cost Johnston between 1,000 and 1,500 men for no real gain.³⁴ While this attack cost the rebels about as many men as the Federals had lost days before at New Hope Church, the effect was much greater on the smaller force. One brigade, known as the "Kentucky Orphan Brigade," lost so many men in this attack on McPherson that the unit disbanded following the campaign.³⁵

This attack would have one slightly positive effect for the southern army though. It forced Sherman to hold his position for another couple of days due to the threat of further Confederate attack.³⁶ With his move away from the railroad to the west, Sherman had turned Johnston out of his strong position at Allatoona Pass. However, Johnston had managed to wreak a couple of severe defeats on Sherman. As the war entered the month of June, the armies would slow even more and the fighting would come to a crescendo.

Sherman Moves to Acworth

Johnston had succeeded in stopping Sherman's easy advance on either Marietta or the Chattahoochee and had inflicted a number of casualties on the Union forces. In the end, he had not forced a decisive battle that would turn back the invasion of Georgia. With the inability of the Union forces to find a way to flank either side of the Confederate lines Sherman began the painstaking task of working his way back to his supply line, and just in time. Though Sherman had brought enough supplies to last him for twenty days with allowances made for foraged material, the difficulty of travelling across the backcountry roads and lack




Figure 4. Union Advance Etowah River to Jonesboro. Map by J. Britt McCarley, United States Center of Military History.

of inhabitants in the area meant that those supplies had begun to run out by the first of June. As early as 27 May, just four days after crossing the Etowah, soldiers were reduced to half rations and livestock, including horses, were dangerously low on fodder.³⁷ It would still be eight days before Sherman's army would reconnect with the rail line at Acworth.

The attack of 28 May compelled the Union forces to hold their lines in case an all-out Confederate assault came as they were pulling out for their move back toward the railroad. To accomplish this movement, Sherman began slowly moving his men to the northeast by extending entrenchments. The Confederates followed closely along and continued the constant skirmishing that had come to define this part of the campaign. Johnston noticed the beginning of this movement on the 27th, but it was not long before the manpower of the Union began to make itself felt. Unbeknownst to Johnston, Federal cavalry took Allatoona Pass unopposed on 31 May, opening Sherman's supply line, and the Union commander would make the former Confederate stronghold into a supply depot to help fuel his march on Atlanta.³⁸

On 1 June, it became apparent that Union troops were beginning to outpace Confederate efforts. By 4 June Johnston had settled into his next defensive position on a line running from Lost Mountain on the left, across Pine Mountain, and ending on Brush Mountain to the right. Johnston once again pulled back from the enemy.³⁹ This ended the fighting during this portion of the campaign, allowing Sherman to consolidate control over an area south of the Etowah and set up his next movements toward Atlanta.

The fighting along the Dallas line was some of the fiercest seen by many of these soldiers. While there were some discernible battles, such as the actions at New Hope Church and Pickett's Mill, there was constant skirmishing up and down the line. Troops on both sides of the fighting found the action around Dallas to be taxing. One Union soldier described it as "probably the most wretched week" of the Atlanta Campaign.⁴⁰ With such terrible conditions, it is no wonder the soldiers, especially those of the Union forces, gave the area the nickname the "Hell Hole."

Several factors combined to create this horrendous atmosphere. The first was the challenging terrain. Nearly every account of this portion of the campaign mentioned how hard it was to travel through this area or even see the enemy. Reports from Oliver O. Howard after the action at Pickett's Mill described the terrain as "dense forests and thicket jungles, over country scarred by deep ravines," with visibility reduced to no more than a few yards on either side.⁴¹ It is little wonder that in attempting to outflank the Confederate forces that day the Union troops instead ran into a bloodbath. Sherman also noted the difficulty of the terrain on more than one occasion. In his memoirs he said the area around Dallas was "very obscure" and "mostly in a state of nature" and noted that although he visited every sector of the Union line during this part of the campaign he rarely saw more than a handful of Confederate troops.⁴² In addition to not being able to see the enemy, it was also quite easy to get lost. Artillerymen from one Union

battery recall getting so mixed up on their march that they almost walked straight into Confederate lines with their guns and gear.⁴³

In addition to challenging terrain, both armies had to contend with terrible weather. Beginning on 24 May it started raining nearly every day, with many days bringing the type of violent thunderstorms that frequently occur in the south during summer. One Union soldier described the storm following the battle at Pickett's Mill as "a furious storm, the rain came down in torrents, the lightning was blinding" and apparently the rainwater was collecting so fast that one man mentioned to his officer they could swim across the lines to fight the enemy.⁴⁴ With the addition of violent weather to the constant threat of bullets from a hidden enemy, it is not surprising that the name "Hell Hole" stuck. One Confederate surgeon mentioned in his diary that by 2 June, the fighting had continued for a week straight through rain and thunder, and the fighting was so terrible that he discovered one Union corpse with forty-seven balls lodged in his body.⁴⁵

Johnston's Last Chance

Many historians who have studied this part of the Atlanta Campaign tend to write it off as something of an aside, perhaps because there was no decisive battle fought or clear winner. Prior to the crossing of the Etowah, the sides clashed at the Battle of Resaca and engaged in clear and decisive movements. After Sherman resumed his march south, the Union and Confederates met at the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain and in the contest for Atlanta.

A closer look, however, reveals much more. From the start of the campaign, Sherman's armies vastly outnumbered the Confederate forces. As the two armies approached Dallas though, the disparity in numbers became much tighter. Conditions forced Sherman to leave detachments along the Western & Atlantic Railroad, as well as to garrison captured cities, while Johnston gathered those he had sent to guard the other end of the same rail line. This meant that as the two armies met along the Dallas line Sherman had an effective strength of around ninety-two thousand men and Johnston had seventy thousand, a ratio of 1.3 to 1 in favor of the Union.⁴⁶ At no other point in the Campaign were the numbers to be so close. According to Sherman, on 5 June, the day after arriving at Acworth, he received a number of reinforcements which more than equaled the number of troops lost during the fighting in the Hell Hole.⁴⁷ If any time had been right for a major battle in the open field, this would have been it.

Besides not bringing the campaign to a decisive battle, Johnston made a number of mistakes that would prevent victory. One, as previously mentioned, was

allowing Union troops to cross the Etowah River uncontested. While the high ground at Allatoona presented an excellent defensive position, Johnston should have realized from the tempo of the campaign up to that point that Sherman would be wary of attacking such a heavily fortified position. Had Johnston spread his army out and guarded the southern bank of the Etowah there is a good chance that the action would have stalled Sherman for weeks without being able to cross. The terrain to the Union's left was very mountainous and rough making a full-scale flanking maneuver of a river position nearly impossible, especially since the Allatoona Mountains overlooked the river. Had Sherman swung out around the Confederate left he would have had to go even further from his supply lines than he did going for Dallas.

Johnston made an even more egregious error by pulling all of Hood's corps out of Allatoona Pass and moving them to the Dallas line. Had he left even a single division at this location it would have presented a serious challenge to Sherman's cavalry forces. This in turn would have forced the Union commander to either mount a full-scale assault on the fortified position, with the added danger of the rest of Johnston's army to the rear, or else pull back above the Etowah to regain his supply lines. Johnston however performed in his usual manner and pulled back in the face of a challenge, deciding that protecting Marietta and the approaches to Atlanta was a safer decision than forcing his opponent back.

Despite this, Johnston's efforts along the Dallas line did produce some major results. He was able to inflict a number of casualties on the Union forces, a number just north of three thousand. While these numbers do not approach the level of casualties inflicted by Lee during the campaign in Virginia, such as the two-week period at Cold Harbor where the Union forces under Grant suffered the loss of about twelve thousand men, it reflects the much different nature of the fighting in Georgia.⁴⁸ Johnston was also able to slow Sherman to a crawl. Where before the crossing Sherman was covering miles a day, the Confederate actions around Dallas forced him to hold the same positions for nearly a week before he could even consider moving back toward his supply lines. This injected some much-needed morale into the Southern army. A Confederate surgeon notes that during this period the troops came to realize that Johnston's constant retreats had nothing to do with cowardice. When there was fighting the southern forces were dealing major blows, however, in their view, Sherman refused to fight.⁴⁹ Though the Confederate forces would have an impressive, though meaningless victory, at Kennesaw Mountain in late June, they lost their best chance of stopping Sherman when they allowed him to return to an unbroken rail line at Acworth. The rest of the campaign became a slow fade into defeat for the Army of Tennessee and the city of Atlanta.

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